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Existing models of open-access resources are applicable to non-storable resources, such as
fish, Many open-access resources, however, are used to produce storable goods. Elephants, rhinos,
and tigers are three prominent examples. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase
current prices, and current poaching, This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be
rational expectations equilibria leading both to extinction and to survival. Governments maybe able
to eliminate extinction equilibria by promising to implement tough anti-poaching measures if the
population falls below a threshold. Alternatively, they, or private agents, maybe able to eliminate
extinction equilibria by accumulating a sufficient stockpile of the storable good.
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Twenty-nine percent of threatened birds worldwide and more than half the threatened
mammals in Australasia and the Americas are subject to over-harvesting [Goombridge, 1992].
Most models of open-access resources assume that the good is non-storable [Clark, 1976;
Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957]. While this may be a reasonable assumption for fish, it is
inappropriate for many other species threatened by over-harvesting, as illustrated in Table I.
Although 30% of threatened mammals are hunted for presumably non-storable meat, 20% are
hunted for fur or hides, which are presumably storable, and approximately 10% are threatened
by the live trade [Goombridge, 1992].
African elephants are a prime example of a resource which is technologically difficult
to protect as private property, and is used to produce a storable good. From 1981 to 1989,
Africa’s elephant population fell from approximately 1.2 million to just over 600,000 [Barbier,
et al., 1990]. Dealers in Hong Kong stockpiled large amounts of ivory [New York Times
Magazine, 1990]. As the elephant population decreased, the constant-dollar price of uncarved
elephant tusks rose from $7.00 a pound in 1969 to $52.00 per pound in 1978, and $66.00 a
pound in 1989 [Simmons and Freuteo., 1989]. The higher prices increased incentives for
poaching.
Recently, governments have toughened enforcement efforts with a ban on the ivory
trade, shooting of poachers on sight, strengthened measures against corruption, and the highly
publicized destruction of confiscated ivory.’ This crackdown on poaching has been
accompanied by decreases in the price of elephant tusks [Bonner, 1993]. Since these policy
changes reduce short-run ivory supply as well as demand, it is not clear that the fall in price
4In September 1988, Kenya’s president ordered that poachers be shot on sight, and in April 1989 Richard Leakey
took over Kenya’s wildlife department.
1would have been predicted under a static model, and indeed most economists did not predict
this decline. However, the fall in price is consistent with the dynamic model set forth in this
paper, under which improved anti-poaching enforcement may increase long-run ivory supply
by allowing the elephant population to recover.
Under the model, anticipated future scarcity of storable resources leads to higher
current prices, and therefore to more intensive current exploitation. For example, elephant
poaching leads to expected future shortages of ivory, and thus raises future ivory prices.
Since ivory is a storable good, current ivory prices therefore rise, and this creates incentives
for more poaching today. Because poaching creates its own incentives, there may be multiple
rational expectations paths of ivory prices and the elephant population for a range of initial
populations.
In order to gain intuition for why there may be multiple rational expectations
equilibria, it is useful to consider the following two period example, for which we thank
Marty Weitzman, Suppose that each year there is a breeding season during which population
grows by an amount B(x) given an initial population of x. Following the breeding season, an
amount h is harvested. Denote the elephant population at the beginning of the harvest season
in year one as Xo. Then the population at the end of the harvest in year one will be X. - hl, and
the population at the end of the harvest in year two will be X. - hl + B(XO- hl) - h2. To keep
the model as simple as possible, we assume that the world ends after two years.FigureII
Time Line for Two Period Example
Time Population
Initial (year 1) Xo
After harvest, hl, in year 1 Xo - hl
After breeding in year 2 X. - hl + B(xo - hl)
After harvest, h2, in year 2 (end of world) X. - hf +B(xo - hl) - h2
Let c denote the cost of harvesting an animal, and denote the amount of the good
demanded at a price ofp as Do). Assume D’ <0 and D(m) = O. The interest rate, which is
assumed to be the only cost of storage, is denoted r.
There will bean equilibrium in which the animal is hunted to extinction in year 1 if
the initial population is less than enough to satisfy demand during the first year at a price of c,
plus demand during the second year at a price of (1+r)c. Algebraically, this can be written as:
X() < D(c) + D((I +r)c).
There will be an equilibrium in which the animal survives if the initial population,
minus the amount required to satisfy first-year demand at price c, plus the births in the
breeding season, is more than enough to satisfy second period demand at price c. This will be
the case if X. - D(c)+ B(XO - D(c))> D(c).
If both conditions hold, then there will be two equilibria. In one, the animal survives.
Lnthe other, the price is high enough that the population is eliminated in the first period, and
the breeding that would have satisfied second-period demand never takes place. There will bemultiple equilibria if the initial population is such that
D((I + r)c) + D(c) > X. > 2D(C) – B(xo – D(c)).
Note that as the interest rate increases, there will be an extinction equilibrium for a
diminishing range of initial population levels. For sufficiently high interest rates, there will
only be a single equilibrium path of population for any initial stock, just as in non-storable
fisheries models.
Note that the example above implicitly assumes that the good is not destroyed when it
is consumed. It thus applies to goods such as rhino horn, which is consumed in traditional
Asian medicines. We will call such goods storable and distinguish them from durable goods,
which are not used up when they are consumed. (Ivory is often considered an example of a
durable good.) In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that there could be multiple
equilibria in a two-period model of durable goods. This paper models storable, but we believe
that except where noted, the results would be qualitatively similar for durable goods.
In the remainder of the paper we use a continuous time, infinite-horizon model, which
allows us to solve for steady-state population and prices, and to examine cases in which
extinction is not immediate following a shift in expectations, or the path of population and
prices is stochastic,
The model may be relevant for policy. It suggests that even if the population level is
steady, so that standard models would predict the continued survival of the species, the
species could still be vulnerable to a switch to an extinction equilibrium. One way to
eliminate the extinction equilibrium would be to increase the population of the animal by
providing additional habitat. This is, however, likely to be expensive.
If governments have credibility, they maybe able to eliminate the extinction
equilibrium, and coordinate on the high population equilibrium, merely by promising to
4implement tough anti-poaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. This
suggests a theoretical possibility that laws which provide little protection to non-endangered
species, and practically unlimited protection to endangered species may be justified in some
cases.
Finally governments or conservation organizations may be able to eliminate the
extinction equilibria by building sufficient stockpiles of the storable good, and threatening to
sell the stockpile if the animal becomes endangered or the price rises beyond a threshold.
This is somewhat analogous to central banks using foreign exchange reserves to defend an
exchange rate (see, for example, [Obstfeld 1986; 1994]). Stockpiles could be built either by
deliberately harvesting animals, or by storing confiscated contraband taken from poachers,
rather than either destroying or selling it.
A number of other papers find multiple equilibria in models of open-access resources
with small numbers of players [Lancaster, 1971; Haurie and Pohjola, 1987; Levhari and
Mirman, 1980; Reinganum and Stokey, 1984; and Benhabib and Radner, 1992]. In these
models, each player prefers to grab resources immediately if others are going to do so, but to
leave resources in place, where they will grow more quickly, if others will not consume them
immediately. Tomell and Velasco [1992] introduce the possibility of storage into this type of
model.
The effects examined in the previous models are unlikely to lead to multiple equilibria
if there are many potential poachers, each of whom assumes that his or her actions have only
an infinitesimal effect on future resource stocks, and on the actions chosen by other players.
This paper argues there may nonetheless be multiple equilibria for open-access renewable
resources used in the production of storable goods, because if others poach, the animal will
become scarce, and this will increase the price of the good, making poaching more attractive.
5Because poaching transforms an open-access renewable resource into a private exhaustible
resource, this paper can be seen as helping unify the Gordon-Schaefer analysis of open-access
renewable resources with Hotelling’s [1931] analysis of optimal extraction of private non-
renewable resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the standard
Gordon-Schaefer fisheries model, in which storage is impossible. Section III shows how the
model can be adapted to allow for storage, and classifies the possible equilibria. Section IV
discusses equilibria in which people believe there is some probability that the economy will
coordinate on extinction and some probability the economy will coordinate on survival,
Section V concludes with a discussion of policy implications,
II. The Standard Gordon-Schaefer Model With No Storage





where x denotes the population, h is the harvesting rate, and B(”), the net-births function, is the
rate of population increase in the absence of harvesting.5 B(O) = O,since if the population is
extinct, no more animals can be born. We will measure the population in units of the habitat’s
carrying capacity, so B( 1) = O,and B(x) is strictly negative for x > 1. B is strictly positive if
population is positive and less than 1. This implies that, without harvesting, the unique stable
steady state for the population is 1.
The rate of harvest will depend on the demand and the marginal cost faced by
5This is often taken to be the logistic function B(x) = x(1 - x).
6poachers. The marginal cost of poaching, c, is a decreasing function of the population x, so
that c = c(x), with c’(x)cO. We assume that c’(x) is bounded and that there is a maximum
poaching marginal cost of cm,so that c(0) = cm.
Given price, p, consumer demand is D(p), where D is continuous, decreasing in p, and
zero at and above a maximum price pm. We will restrict ourselves to the case in which
pm> cm,so that some poaching will be profitable, no matter how small the population. This
condition is necessq for extinction to be a stable steady-state.
Since the good is open-access, and storage is assumed to be impossible, its price must
be equal to the marginal poaching cost. Algebraically, p = c(x). The harvest must be exactly
equal to consumer demand, so h = D(c(x)). The evolution of the system in which storage is
impossible is thus described by:
&
~ = B(x) – D(c(x)) = F(x) 11.2
We assume that B, D, and c are differentiable. Since B(O) = O,and pm > cm,
D(c(0)) >0, so that F(O) e O,as illustrated in Figure H.1. Thus, zero is a stable steady state of
11,2. F(l) e Osince B(l) = O,and D(c(l)) >0. We will consider the case in which F is positive
at some point in (O,1), so that extinction is not inevitable. Assuming that F is single-peakedG,
there will generically be points XSand Xu so that F is negative and increasing on (O,Xu),
positive on (Xu, XS), and negative and decreasing on (XS, 1]. Hence, if population is between
Oand Xu, it will become extinct, whereas if it starts above Xu, it will tend to the high steady
state, X~. Thus, if storage is impossible, there will be multiple steady states, but a unique
equilibrium given initial population.
6For most of the sequel, we don’t strictly need F to be single peaked, but this requirement simplifies the analysis
and the notation, and is not too restrictive.
7III. Equilibria with Storage
This section introduces the possibility of storage into a Gordon-Schaefer type model.
We assume that storage is competitive, that there is no intertemporal substitution in demand
for the good, and that the cost of storage is an interest cost, with rater.
We will look for rational expectations equilibria, or paths of population, stores, and
price in which poachers, consumers, and storers are behaving rationally at all times. This
section considers perfect foresight equilibria, in which the path is deterministic; Section IV
considers equilibria in which the path is stochastic. The steady states of the model with
storage are the same as those in the model without storage, as we show below.7 Indeed, the
stable steady states of the last section comprise the entire stable limit set of the system with
storage (i.e. there are no cycles or chaotic attractors).
We analyze the fairly general model introduced in the last section with two stable
steady states, one at zero and the other at Xs. In fact, the propositions of this section can be
easily generalized to cover much more general models in which there are many stable steady
states, or in which extinction is not stable.
Our strategy for finding equilibria is as follows. Simple accounting arithmetic and the
absence of arbitrage opportunities in poaching and storage yield local equilibrium conditions
on the possible equilibrium paths. Because there may or may not be storage or poaching, it
turns out that there Me three possible different dynamic r6gimes: no storage, storage, and no
poaching. Using the local equilibrium conditions, we derive differential equations for the
equilibrium paths in each r6gime. The steady states give terminal or boundary conditions
7We will make a distinction between a steady state, which is a stationmy value of population and stores, and an
equilibrium.
8which allow us completely to determine the equilibrium paths, which we represent using
phase diagrams in population-stores space. The steady states provide a terminal condition that
allow us completely characterize the equilibrium paths.
LOCAL EQUILIBRIUM AND FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS
The local equilibrium conditions are determined by the absence of arbitrage
opportunities for both poachers and storers of the good:
The Storage Condition
prices. As in [Hotelling
The possibility of storage introduces constraints on the path of





wheres denotes the amount of the good that is stored. If the price were rising less quickly,
people would sell their stores, and if the price were rising more quickly, peop!e would hold on
to their stores or poach more. This “storage condition” is slack when stores are zero. In this
case, dp/dt S rp, because otherwise people would find it profitable to hold stores.
The Poaching Condition Because poaching is competitive, if there is poaching at all, the
price of the good must be equal to the marginal cost of poaching another unit of the good,
which is c(x) if the population is x. Thus the “poaching condition” is that
p = c(x), if there is poaching. m.2
This condition is slack if there is no poaching, in which case p < c(x).Note that, in addition to the local equilibrium conditions above, there are some
feasibility conditions:
“Conservation of Elephants” At all times, the increase in stores plus the increase in
population must equal the net births minus the amount consumed, or
i+i=B(x)– D(p). nI.3
Note that, as mentioned earlier, we assume that the good is destroyed when it is
consumed. Note also that animals which die naturally cannot be turned into the storable
good.g
Finally, both population, x, and stores, s, must be non-negative at all times.
The above conditions imply that, once on an equilibrium path, population, stores, and
price, must be a continuous function of time. This is because, with perfect foresight, jumps
would be anticipated and arbitraged. See Appendix A, proposition A. 1 for a more formal proof.
As we discuss below, there maybe an initial jump to get to the equilibrium path.
These conditions must be satisfied at all points on a rational expectations equilibrium
path. There are four conceivable dynamic r6gimes for the system, depending on which of the
storage and poaching conditions (III. 1 and IH.2) are binding at any time, but only three of
these potential r6gimes are actually possible:
No Storage Rkgime Stores are zero, but there is poaching. The zero profit condition for
poaching implies that p = c(x). The storage condition restricts the rate at which the price can
rise and not induce storage (p < rp ). Because the price is inversely related to the population,
s We write the conservation condition as an equality. Because the price is positive, no one would throw the good
away voluntarily.
10it is possible to translate this condition that prices may not rise too fast into a condition that
the population may not fall too fast: differentiating p = c(x), the condition that no one wants to





In the No Storage Regime, the dynamics are the same as Section II, the model with no
storage:




Storage Rkgime Stores are positive and there is poaching, so dpldt = rp, and
p = c(x). Here, the exponential path of the price translates into a differential equation
population: differentiating p = c(x) gives the same expression, but with equality, that
for the No Storage r6gime (111.4). Given the path of population and, hence, price and
for
we had
consumption, the dynamics of stores are determined by “consemation of elephants” (IH.3), and
we can express all the local equilibrium dynamics in terms of the population, x:
c(x) ~=r —
c’(x)
i = B(x) – D(c(x)) – x .
p = rc(x)
111.6
No Poaching Rkgime Stores are positive, but there is no poaching. Without poaching,
the rate of change of population is just the net birth rate. All demand is being satisfied from
stores, so stores must be falling at the same rate as demand. For stores to be positive, price
must be rising exponentially at rate r. The dynamics can thus be summmized by:
11j = ~(x)
i = –D(p) .
p=~p
Note that since there is no poaching, it is not possible to substitute c(x) for p.
111.7
No Storage, No Poaching This is impossible if population is positive, since it would imply
that there is no consumption, so the price must be pm, but pm is greater than cm,which is the
maximum marginal cost of poaching, so there would have to be poaching, which contradicts
the assumption that there was no poaching.
To be in steady state, stores must be zero because, when they are positive, price must
be rising exponentially. This means that there are only two stable steady states: extinction, in
which population and stores are zero, and what we will call the “high steady state”, in which
population is Xs, stores are zero, and price is c(Xs). If stores are zero, then the system must be
in the No Storage r6gime, and will thus have the same steady states as the model with no
storage in Section II, i.e. x = Oor X~,
DYNAMICS WITHIN THE STORAGE AND NO STORAGE REGIMES
We shall begin by looking at the two r6gimes in which there is poaching: No Storage
and Storage.
Equilibrium Paths in the No Storage Rkgime.
For the system to be in the no storage rggime in equilibrium, people must not want to
hold positive stores, so price must not be rising faster than rp. Since the price is determined by
12the population, p = c(x), storage implies that the population cannot fall too fast. Specifically,
from 111.4and 111.5,
rc(x)
B(x) – D(c(x)) 2 — 111.8
c’(x) -
As is clear from Figure 111.1,for small enough r, 111.8will hold if and only if
x l [Xu”,X~*],where X~*and XU*are the two critical points at which the storage condition is
just binding, i.e. B - D = r c / c‘. Moreover, O< XU*< Xu < X~< X~*.
If the system starts with population in (Xux~*] and no stores, then it is an equilibrium
to follow the No Storage R6gime dynamics to X~,the stable steady state. If the system starts
with no stores and a population of exactly Xu, the unstable steady state, the system will stay
there. Here, as elsewhere, for the sake of clarity we shall not discuss measure zero cases like
this in any detail.
If the system starts with no stores and with population in [Xu”,Xu), then the No
Storage dynamics will eventually take population to a point less than XU*. At some point,
therefore, the system must leave the No Storage R6gime and enter the Storage R6gime. We
discuss this after we have found the equilibrium paths in the Storage R6gime.
Equilibrium Paths in the Storage R6gime
The dynamics of population are determined by the price, which is rising exponentially.
The dynamics of stores are determined by “conservation of elephants”: what is harvested and
not consumed must be stored. We may rewrite 111.6as a differential equation for the trajecto~
of stores,s, in terms of x:
ds c’(x)
{
c(x) —= — B(x) – D(c(x)) – r —
& rc(x) 1 c’(x) “
lIr.9
13dx/dt is still just rc(x)/c’(x), which is strictly negative, and bounded above.
Equation 111.9implies that rational expectations trajectories in population-stores space
must have stores decreasing with population, x, if x c XU*,or x > X~*. Stores must be an
increasing function of population if x l (Xu”, X,S*).There is a maximum of stores at XU*,and
a minimum at X~*. To see the intuition for this, note that if population is very high or very
low, population would tend to fall rapidly without stores, and as may be seen from Figure
III. 1, it would fall rapidly enough that price would be rising faster than rate r. In order to
prevent population from falling too rapidly, part of demand must be satisfied out of stores, and
so stores must decrease with time. XU*and X~*are the points at which, in the absence of
stores, the population would fall just fast enough that price would rise at rate r, Between XU*
and Xs*,the price would rise more slowly than rate r with no storage. For an equilibrium with
stores, therefore, more than current demand must be being harvested and stores must increase
to make the population fall fast enough so that price rises at exactly rate r.
Equation 111.9is the differential equation for the trajectories of equilibria in
population-stores space. The equilibria are now to be determined by boundary conditions.
One possibility is that stores run out while population is still positive, and the system enters
the No Storage R6gime. The only place at which this can possibly happen is where population
is exactly X~*. To see why, consider the following: to be in the No Storage R6gime,
x l [Xu”,X~*]. Because population, stores and price are continuous in equilibrium, the system
must leave the Storage r6gime at the same point at which it enters the No Storage r~gime. As
explained above, stores are decreasing as a function of x, so strictly increasing as a function
of time (x is falling) if x = (Xu”, XS*),and at a maximum at x = XU*. But stores have to run out
at the point of transition from the Storage to No Storage R6gime, so stores must have been
14falling, (or at least not increasing or at a maximum) immediately before the transition. The
only point at which stores could run out is, therefore, X~*.
The other possible boundary condition is that population becomes extinct before stores
run out. Since x is decreasing at a rate which is bounded below while stores are positive, the
population must become extinct in finite time if stores do not run out. After that, stores will
be consumed until they reach zero as well. It turns out that the quantity of stores remaining
when the population becomes extinct is uniquely determined in a rational expectations
equilibrium. To see this, note that the price charged for the last unit of stores must be pm, the
maximum price people are willing to pay for the good, or a storer would profit by waiting
momentarily to sell his or her stock, The zero profit condition in poaching implies that the
price when the population becomes extinct must be c(0)= cm. Price is rising exponentially
while stores are positive, so we can calculate the amount, U@), consumed from the time when
price is p until price reaches pm:
()
~ln~
U(p) = ‘ J\(p err)dt. 111.1o
0
The amount of stores remaining at the moment of extinction must, therefore, be U(c~).
We have shown that there can only be two equilibrium paths in the Storage R6gime
(See Figure 111.2)
1 High Steady State Storage Equilibrium In this equilibrium, population starts at
x 2 X~*.The system evolves until stores run out when population is Xs*, and then
enters the No Storage R&gime. The equations p = c(x), and dp/dt = r p determine the




s+(x)= J— B(q) – D(c(q)) – r— 1
dq . 111.11
~:rc(q) c’(q)
2 Extinction Storage Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, population becomes extinct, and
at that moment, stores = U(c~). The equations p = c(x) and dp/dt = rp determine the









For this to be an equilibrium, stores must stay positive at all times along this path. If
stores would have to become negative at some point in the future, this path is not an
equilibrium. Ifs.(x) is ever negative, we define X- o t be the smallest positive root of
s,(x). If there is none such, we say that X_ = m. To be an equilibrium, the starting
population must be less than X-.
se(x) and s+(x) are parallel. Both have a minimum at X~*. It is clear from Figure 111,2
that Xrna is finite if and only if se(x) lies below s+(x). If X~ is finite, it must lie between XU*
and X~*.
Transitions Between Storage and No Storage Rkgimes
We now examine under which circumstances an equilibrium path can move from the
No Storage to the Storage R6gime. If the initial population is small enough, an equilibrium
path can move to the Storage r&gime and, thence, to extinction. It may have to do this: if
Xu’ >0 and the system starts in the No Storage r6gime with population less than Xu, then the
system must eventually move to the Storage r6gime because if it didn’t, the population would
fall fast enough to violate the storage condition once it had fallen past XU*. On an equilibrium
16path, the system must move to the Storage r6gime before that point is reached. The system
may also move to the Storage r6gime when it doesn’t strictly have to. By continuity of stores,
the system must make the transition from the No Storage to the Storage r6gime where
s.(x) = O,i.e.at X-9. If the path in the No Storage r6gime crosses X_, then the system can
move to the Storage r6gime path se leading to extinction. At such a transition, the rates of
change of population, stores, and price will jump, but the storage and poaching conditions are
not violated because the levels will not jump.
We may thus define two sets of points on equilibrium paths in the Storage and No
Storage r6gimes: A,, the set of points leading to extinction, and A+, the set of points leading to
the high steady state, as illustrated in Figure 111.3.
The system must end up on one of these paths, A+or A,. Given arbitrary initial values
of population and stores (XO,,SO), there can either be an initial cull, or there can be an interlude
when there is no poaching, as discussed below.
MOVING TO EQUILIBRIUM
If the initial population and stores are not on one of the equilibria identified above,
then one of two things will happen. If the initial point in population-stores space is below the
equilibrium paths described above, then the system may jump instantaneously to one of the
equilibrium paths via a cull. If the initial point is above an equilibrium, demand may be
satisfied from stores with no poaching for a while until the path meets Ae or A+.
9The transition cannot happen at X~*,because the population would be falling there in the No Storage r6gime, so
the system could never reach that point,
17Culling
If the system starts below an equilibrium path in population stores space, there maybe
an instantaneous harvest, which we shall call a “cull”. In this case, the price starts high
enough that it is above the marginal cost implied by the initial population, C(xo), and there
will be instantaneous poaching up to the point at which the price is equal to the marginal
cost.l” Although continuity of price, population, and stores is required by rationality, such a
jump is allowed if it is unanticipated, or at the “beginning of time”, as it is in this case. We
will make a distinction between “initial” values of population and stores and “starting” values,
which are the values just after the initial cull. When we need to indicate this, we will write
(XO, SO) for initial population and stores, and (x(0), s(O)) to denote starting (i.e. at time Oon the
equilibrium path) values.
In a cull, live elephants are killed and turned into dead elephants one-to-one. This
means that, in population-stores space, the system moves up a downward sloping diagonal,
and the total quantity of elephants, dead or alive, is conserved. We call this quantity
Q= x + S. For a CU1lto be rational, it must take the system to a point on one of the
equilibrium paths we identified above, A, or A+.
To get to the high steady state equilibrium path by culling, initial population and stores
must lie below the lines = s+(x), and X. < X~*.
To get to the path leading to extinction, if XM is infinite, the initial point must lie
belows = ~,(x). If X~ is finite, points below se(x) can also cull to the equilibrium, but there
may also be other points from which this is feasible, In particular, if the curves = se(x) has a
‘0If the marginal cost of poaching became sufficiently great as the instantaneous rate of poaching became great
enough, the harvest would take place over time, rather than instantaneously. Structurally, though, there is little
real difference in the two approaches: the rational expectations equilibria are determined by the boundary
conditions (where people anticipate the system must end up), and these are essentially the same in both cases.
18tangent of gradient -1, then, as illustrated in Figure 111.4,points above the curve, but below the
tangent can also reach the extinction equilibrium by culling. A quick look at 111,9shows that
the points at which s.(x) has gradient -1 are Xu and Xs, but only the tangent at Xu lies above
the curve. The value of Q at this tangency, Q-, is the maximum value Q may have so that
the extinction equilibrium may be reached via culling. If X- e Xu, then this tangency doesn’t
exist, and only points belows. can cull to the extinction equilibrium.
No Poaching
If there are sufficient initial stores, there will be equilibria in which the starting price is
below c(x), and there is no poaching for a time while demand is satisfied out of stores,
Eventually poaching must resume, at a point on A, or A+, While there is no poaching,
population will be rising, and stores falling as they are consumed. Price is rising
exponentially, at rate r. In population-stores space, trajectories with no poaching must be
downward sloping and population must be increasing so long as population is less than one.
When poaching resumes at a point on one of the A[ paths, price, population, and stores
are all determined. Given the end point, there is a unique, downward sloping no poaching
trajectory leading to it. In order for no poaching to be rational, and for an initial point to end
up on one of the Ai, the initial point must lie on one of these trajectories (Figure IH.5). To get
to the path leading to the high steady state, the initial point must lie to the right of the
boundary of the set of points on trajectories leading to A+, which we denote L+, and above the
curves = s+(x). To get to the path leading to extinction, the initial point must lie to the left of
the boundary of the set of points on trajectories leading to points on A., which we denote L,.
We include a more formal treatment of this in the Appendix A, proposition A.3.
19We have now found all the possible equilibria of the model with storage, As
illustrated in Figure 111.6,population-stores space may be divided into at most three regions
depending on whether there exist equilibria leading to extinction, the high steady state, or
both. In the first region, there is no equilibrium path leading to extinction. This will be the
case if the initial population and stores are high enough, so that killing and storing enough to
get to extinction would mean that stores would have to be held long enough that the storers
would lose money. In the second region, there is no equilibrium path leading to the high
steady state. This is the case if population and stores are low enough that, even if poaching
were temporarily to cease and demand were to be satisfied from stores until they should run
out, the population cannot recover enough to guarantee species survival. The third region is
where there are multiple possible equilibria, some to extinction, and some to the high steady
state. In this deterministic, perfect foresight model, which equilibrium is chosen is
determined by exogenously formed, self-fulfilling expectations.
Depending on parameter values, some of these regions maybe empty. It is possible
that there will be no region in which survival is assured, If X_ is infinite, any point can get
to the extinction set A,, either through a cull if it lies below s., or by an interlude with no
poaching if it lies above s,.
If, on the other hand, x- is small enough (less than X~), then there will be no region
of multiple equilibria, and the fate of the system will be entirely determined by its initial point,
and not by expectations.
Note that, if there is an initial no poaching interlude, the population will be rising to
start with even if the eventual fate of the system is extinction. There will often be over-
shooting with No Poaching equilibria, and one should not, therefore, become complacent if
20elephant populations are increasing,
It turns out that X_ and Q- are both decreasing in r, the storage cost. For proofs,
see Appendix A, proposition A.2. This should not come as a surprise. Q- tells us the
largest population can be and still reach extinction via culling and a storage equilibrium path.
The larger the population, the longer stores have to be held before extinction. This is clearly
going to be less desirable with higher storage costs. Increasing the storage cost thus always
reduces the region of phase space from which extinction is possible. Governments could
increase storage costs by threatening prosecution of anybody found to be storing the good.
The international ban on ivory trade may have had this effect,
For sufficiently large r, X- wi11be less than Xu, and there will be no region of
multiple equilibria at all; the ultimate fate of the species is the same as in the model with no
storage possible, given the same initial conditions. In this sense, our model converges to the
standard Gordon-Schaefer model as storage cost rises.
If Qm > X~,then even starting from the high steady state with no stores, the
population will be vulnerable to coordination on the extinction equilibrium. This highlights
another possible policy response to limit the possibility of extinction: the government or
private conservation organizations may increase the size of habitat available to the species.
Increasing the habitat, while leaving demand unchanged, will increase the steady state
population, X~,more than proportionally. At the same time, Q_ will fall. We show, in
Appendix A, proposition A,4 that, for sufficient habitat, X~will be above Qm, and the
species will then be safe from speculative attacks leading to extinction when it is in the high
steady state.
21IV. Non-Deterministic Equilibria
So far, we have focused on perfect foresight equilibria, in which all agents believe that
the economy will follow a deterministic path. This section considers a broader class of
rational expectations equilibria in which agents may attach positive probability to a number of
future possible paths of the economy. One reason to consider this broader class of equilibria
is that the perfect foresight equilibrium concept has the uncomfortable property that there may
be a path from A to B, and from B to C, but not from A to C. To see this, note that if Q_ is
greater than Xs, then for sufficient initial population, the only equilibrium will lead to the high
steady state. For a system that starts in the high steady state, however, an extinction storage
equilibrium would also be possible.
Note also that the concept of no poaching regimes is also much more relevant when
stochastic paths are admissible, since in order to have an equilibrium with no poaching, there
must be stores, and the only way stores can be generated within the model is through a storage
equilibrium. However, within the limited class of perfect foresight equilibria, people must
assign zero weight to the possibility that there might be a switch from an storage regime to a
no poaching regime.
While we have not fully categorized the extremely broad class of equilibria with
stochastic rational expectations paths, we have been able to describe a subclass of equilibria,
which we conjecture illustrates some more general aspects of behavior. We consider
equilibria in which agents believe there is a constant hazard that a sunspot will appear and
that, when this happens, the economy will switch to the extinction storage equilibrium, with
22no possibility of any other switches. 11 Thus all agents know that the economy will switch to
the extinction equilibrium eventually with probability one, but they are unsure when. We
divide time into two parts: before the sunspot (B.S.), and after the sunspot (A.S.), The
equilibrium behavior A.S. is simple: it is just the extinction equilibrium we found in the last
section. In this section, we look for equilibria B.S. in which the population does not become
extinct.
We first derive a stochastic analogue of the storage condition. We then show that
there are equilibria with a small switching hazard in which the behavior is similar to that seen
in section III: the B.S. steady state population is X~,and no stores are held in this steady state.
There are also equilibria with a higher switching hazard in which positive stores are held in
B.S. steady-state equilibrium in anticipation of a switch to the extinction equilibrium. There
cannot be equilibria with a hazard rate above a certain threshold, because in this case
extinction would become so likely that it would become certain and the system would have to
jump immediately to the extinction equilibrium.
We also show that while the species can survive a series of small increases in the
hazard rate of switching by building up stores after each increase, it might not be able to
sustain the same increase in the h=ard rate if it took place in a single jump, because the
required increase in storage would be so great as to drive the species into extinction.
In this section, it is mathematically more convenient to work with the total of stores
and population, Q, rather than stores,s, Since Q =s + x, working with (x,Q) is equivalent to
working with (x,J).
For the sake of clarity and brevity, we relegate all proofs to Appendix B, where we
llIn some cases, extinction is instantaneous after the switch, so there is no way that agents could rationally
ascribe positive probability to any further switch.
23derive the results of this section more formally.
B.S. Equilibrium Conditions
Let the B.S. state be (x, Q, p), and the A.S. state be (x., Q, p,). Note that, since the
switch happens instantaneously by culling, Q doesn’ t change when the sunspot appears. If
there are positive stores, the expected profit from storage must be zero, so that, if we denote
by n the hazard rate that the sunspot will appear:
~+(pe–p)n=rp ifs>O, Iv. 1
If stores are zero, it must be because expected profits from storage are not positive, and so
~+(p, –p)n<rp ifs=O. IV.2
IV. 1 & IV.2 are just generalizations of the storage condition when the price change is
stochastic, and not necessarily continuous.
We shall consider equilibria in which, once the system is in the extinction equilibrium,
there is no possibility of further change. (x., Q) must, therefore, lie on the extinction storage
equilibrium path derived in section III. In some cases, there maybe more than one point on
this path to which the system could jump. We will consider equilibria in which the system
jumps to the lowest possible population on this path. Thus the population after the switch is a
function of Q: x.(Q) is the smallest population such that s.(x,(Q)) + xc(Q) = Q. This is
illustrated in Figure IV. 1. Because harvesting cannot increase the population, for people to
believe in the possibility of a switch to the extinction equilibrium we must have x 2 x.(Q),
We will also only formally consider cases in which Q-is bigger than X~. The system must,
therefore, be in the region where Q- 2 Q 2 x > x.(Q).
By assumption, the system jumps to the extinction equilibrium path if there is a
24sunspot. We may, therefore, determine the A.S price as a function of Q, the total stores plus
population at the time of the sunspot. Q is conserved during the switch. p, is a decreasing
function of Q (as we prove in Appendix B, proposition B. 1), and it is continuous on [0, Qm].
When Q S U(c~), the system jumps straight to extinction, and p. = U1(Q), When Q > U(c~),
the population jumps to x,(Q), and p, = c(x,(Q)).
We first consider the system dynamics when there are positive stores, so that IV. 1
holds. By an argument analogous to that used in Section III, while stores are positive (i.e.
Q 2 x), the system evolves before the sunspot according to the differential equations:
Q=B(x) - D(c(x)) = F(x)
C,:x) [(~+ ~)c(x) - ZPe(Q)]” x.—
IV,3
B.S. Steady States
It is rather easy to solve for the steady states of IV.3. The first equation tells us that,
for total stores and population to be constant, population must be either Xs, or zero (we ignore
Xu), just as was the case in the deterministic case in the last section. We are interested in the
steady state at Xs. Given the population X.S,the B.S. price will be c(Xs). To determine the
steady state level of stores, note that the more stores, the lower the A.S. price will be, and so
the less profitable it will be to speculate on the sunspot’s appearance. There will thus be a
unique level of stores plus population, Qs, that satisfies the storage condition with equality.
The second equation of IV.3 allows us to solve for this level of stores in terms of the interest
rate, the sunspot hazard, and the characteristics of the extinction equilibrium after the sunspot:
-’(=C(XS))
Q, = P, IV.4
25Because stores must be positive, this is only a feasible B.S. steady state if Qs 2 Xs.
This will be the case for z 2 ml,where
If z < Zl, the storage condition cannot be satisfied with equality at Xs, and there must be zero
stores in steady state.
Because it must be possible to reach the A.S. equilibrium path via culling, it is also the
case that we must have Qs < S,(XU)+ Xu. If Q_ is finite, the right hand side of IV.5 is just
Q IIw.x. Even if Q- is infinite, this equation still holds, as if stores are too large at X.S,one
cannot cull to a point on the extinction equilibrium. For this to hold, n must be below n~,
where
rc(X~ )
‘h = C(XU) –c(Xs) “ IV.6
In summary, then, if n < ml,then there is no B.S. steady state equilibrium with positive
stores. In this case, Xs is a steady state with no stores, just as it was in the perfect-foresight
case of section III: the sunspot probability is low enough that the costs of holding positive
stores outweigh the expected profit when the sunspot happens.
If Z1< n < rc~,then there is a B.S. steady state with positive stores, (Xs, Qs). The
possibility of the sunspot causes agents to hold positive stores in anticipation, so the more
likely the sunspot’s occurrence, the higher the stores held in anticipation of it (see Appendix
B, proposition B.2).
If z > nh, there exists no B.S. steady state at X~. This is because if the sunspot
probability is high enough, extinction becomes self-fulfilling even before the sunspot happens,
26and there is no steady state equilibrium before the sunspot apart from extinction,
B.S. Equilibrium Dynamics
We now summarize the main features of the B.S, equilibrium dynamics. Details of
this are in Appendix B, propositions B.2 - B.7. Figure IV.2 illustrates a possible phase
diagram in x - Q space.
Steady states for population Xu are always totally unstable, so we ignore them.
If n < Zl, then the dynamics are basically the same as for the perfect foresight case.
Along the equilibrium path, there will be some level of positive stores s+”(x) when population
is above a critical value X~’, In this case, population decreases towards X~over time, and
stores are falling and run out at X~=,the stochastic analogue of X.S’,where the storage condition
IV.2 is just binding. The system continues to the B.S. steady state x = X,S,s = Oin the No
Storage r~gime exactly as in section III. As we show in the Appendix B, proposition B.4, Xsn
is decreasing with n. Obviously X,So = X~*,and X;’ = X~,
If Z1 < z c n~, the B.S. equilibrium path is the saddle path of the fixed point (X.S,Q~),
This saddle path rises with increasing n. This means, as is not surprising, that if the
probability of a sunspot is higher, then higher stores will be held for all population levels, not
just at the steady state. We illustrate the dynamics in Figure IV,3.
Comparative Statics and Unanticipated Changes in n
Now we consider unanticipated changes inn, the transition hazard. If n increases”,
12If n decreases, of course, the price would have to fall to get back to the stable manifold, and poaching would
stop for a while in a non-deterministic version of a no poaching equilibrium.
27the B.S. equilibrium path moves up, and there will be a cull to get to the new equilibrium path
from the old one, so long as the increase in n is not too big. If the increase in n is too big the
required cull will be so large that the new equilibrium path cannot be reached, and the system
will switch immediately to the extinction equilibrium. Note that a large increase in n need not
necessarily lead to extinction if it happens gradually, in a series of small, unanticipated steps.
If the increase in n is slow enough, then the equilibrium is sustainable up to the point at which
the equilibrium ceases to exist altogether (i,e. n~).
Thus, if a policy maker knew that there had to be a shift in expectations towards a
higher probability of extinction, and somehow had control over the timing of that shift, it
would be best to make the shift gradual, rather than rapid. This hints that if policy makers
have access to continuously changing information about the state of the population, it might
be best for them to release this information on a regular basis, rather than simply trying to
cover up bad news about the availability of the resource and hope that the situation repairs
itself before people find out. This can only be conjectured, however, because in the model,
there is no uncertainty about the population, only about what other agents are thinking.
We conjecture that if there was a chance of switching to a no poaching equilibrium at
any point on the A.S. trajectory, the rate of growth of prices in the extinction equilibria would
have to be higher. Similarly, the possibility of switching back to an extinction equilibrium
from a no poaching equilibrium would mean that the rate of growth of prices would have to be
lower in the no poaching equilibrium. Note that the possibility of switching to a no poaching
equilibrium makes it harder to have a storage equilibrium, just as increasing storage costs
would.
28v. Conclusion
This paper has argued that there may be multiple possible rational expectation paths of
population and prices for open-access resources used in the production of storable goods.
Expectation of future poaching will increase future prices, and this will increase current
prices, thus rationalizing the initial increase in poaching. Note that this argument does not
apply to non-storable goods, such as fish, because the price of fish depends only on current
supply and demand, and not on expectations of prices. It also does not apply to privately held
goods, such as oil, since anticipation of higher prices will lead people to postpone extracting
the resource.
It is becoming cost-effective for people to assert property rights to elephants in a few
areas of Africa [Simmons and Kreuteo, 1989]. Most elephants, however, continue to live in
open-access areas, and only a fraction of the elephant population can profitably be protected
as private property. (It is expensive to protect elephants as private property, since they
naturally range over huge territories and ordinary fences cannot contain them [Bonner, 1993].)
If elephants can only be supported as private property above a certain price, then there maybe
one equilibrium in which they are a plentiful open-access resource at a low price, and another
equilibrium in which they are a scarce private resource at a high price.
The analysis carries several policy implications. First, it indicates that in order to
assure the survival of a species, it maybe necessary to preserve a large enough herd not only
to allow the species to survive at current equilibrium poaching levels, but also to prevent an
equilibrium with a higher level of poaching. If Q- > X,S,then the population may appear
safe, but may in fact be vulnerable to a switch in equilibrium. One way to rule out the
extinction equilibrium is to increase the habitat for the animal, so that the steady-state
29population becomes greater than Q-.
It maybe possible for governments and international organizations to avoid the
extinction equilibrium if they can commit to drastic measures to prevent extinction, This
could keep prices down and reduce the incentive to poach. If a government or international
organization could credibly announce that it would spend a lmge amount on elephant
protection if the herd fell below a certain critical size, it might never actually have to spend
the money, whereas if the same government spent a moderate amount on elephant protection
each year, the herd might become extinct. The model thus suggests a rationale for
conservation laws that extend little protection to a species until it is declared endangered, and
then provide extensive protection with almost no regard to cost.13 Whether this is important
empirically is another matter.
While conservationists and governments may wish to coordinate on low-poaching
equilibria, people who hold stores will prefer to coordinate on a high-poaching equilibrium, in
which the species becomes extinct. In fact, although game officials in Zimbabwe removed the
horns of some rhinos in order to protect them from poaching, poachers killed the rhinos
anyway. The New York Times [July 11 or 12, 1994], quotes a wildlife official as explaining
their behavior by saying “If Zimbabwe is to lose its entire rhino population, such news would
increase the values of stockpiles internationally.” 14
Note that if there were a “George Soros” of elephants who had sufficient resources, or
were not subject to credit constraints, he or she could use his or her market power to
coordinate on the extinction equilibrium simply by offering to buy enough of the good at a
13On the other hand, the model suggests that if the government plans to impose such strong anti-poaching
enforcement that the long-run harvest will decline, and announcing these regulations ahead of time may lead to a
rush to poach.
14It is also possible that the poachers killed the rhinos to obtain the stumps of their horns, or to make rhino
poaching easier in the future.
30high enough price. Aspeculator whoalready owned some of thegood would make
substantial profits by inducing coordination on the extinction equilibrium, so this equilibrium
may be more likely in the absence of government intervention, assuming the parameters are
such that both extinction and survival equilibria exist.
The model also suggests that it maybe possible to eliminate the extinction equilibrium
by accumulating a sufficient stockpile of the storable good, and threatening to release it onto
the market if the animal goes extinct or becomes sufficiently endangered, (Note that this
policy is more likely to be time consistent than policies which promise to spend arbitrary
amounts of resources to preserve an animal. If the animal is already going extinct, there is no
reason not to sell the stockpile.) As illustrated in Figure IH.6, if Q- is finite, but greater than
the high steady state, X~,then an extinction equilibrium will exist in steady state if the
government does not stockpile stores. If the government or a conservation organization holds
stores greater than the boundary of the region where the extinction equilibria cease to exist,
and credibly promises to release them onto the market if the population falls below a
threshold, the extinction equilibrium will be eliminated. The organization holding stores
would have to pay the interest costs on the stores, and this would entail a financial loss, but
the price might be worth paying if the organization valued conservation, and the stores
eliminated the extinction equilibrium,
If Q- is infinite, stores cannot eliminate the extinction equilibrium, but they can
extend the range of the survival equilibrium. For example, suppose that the initial stock is X~,
and the initial stores are zero, but that there is an exogenous shock to population, for example
due to disease. If there are no stores, then the species will be driven to extinction if the
population dips below XU*.However, if there are sufficient stores, there will be a no poaching
equilibrium in which demand is satisfied by stores and the population can recover.
31Bergstrom [1990] has suggested that confiscated contraband should be sold onto the
market. This analysis suggests that an alternative policy would be to hold confiscated supplies
of goods such as rhino horn and released them on onto the market only if it appears that the
market is coordinating on the extinction equilibrium. For example, a rule might be adopted
that confiscated rhino horn would be sold only if the rhino population dipped below a certain
level, or the price rose above a certain level,
Stores could be built up not only by confiscating contraband, but also by harvesting.
Sick animals could be harvested, and animals could be harvested during periods when
population is temporarily above its steady state level, due, for example, to a run of good
weather,
Building up stores will reduce the population, but only temporarily. Once the target
stockpile has been accumulated, harvesting to buildup the stockpiles can be discontinued, and
the live population will return to the same level as in the absence of stockpiling. The presence
of the stockpiles, however, will permanently eliminate or reduce the chance of a switch to the
extinction equilibrium. If Q- were less than X~ it is particularly important to build up
stockpiles gradually, so as to prevent the population from falling below Q~w, and thus
creating an opportunity for coordination on the extinction equilibrium.
Many conservationists oppose selling confiscated ivory on the market, for fear that it
would legitimize the ivory trade. Building stores achieves the same goal of depressing prices,
but without the disadvantage of legitimizing the ivory trade. Stores could potentially be held
until scientists develop cheap and reliable ways of marking or identifying “legitimately” sold
animal products so they can be distinguished from illegitimate products.
While stockpiles may help promote conservation of animals which are killed for goods
which are storable but not durable, such as rhino horn, this analysis does not strictly apply to
32durable goods, utility from them. Elephant ivory is often considered an example of such a
durable good. The government has no reason to wait before selling confiscated durable
goods, since in any case, private agents will store any durable goods sold on the market. In
practice, however, there are few completely durable goods. Even ivory is not perfectly
durable, since it depreciates, and uncarved ivory is not perfectly substitutable for carved ivory,
due to changing styles and demand for personalized ivory seals.
In the perfect foresight model of Section III, no private stores were held by speculators
in the high steady-state. However, if the price is stochastic, either due to sunspot
coordination, as in Section IV, or to exogenous shocks, such as weather or disease, then
speculators may hold stores, and government stores may crowd these out. In the example
considered in Section IV, government stores would crowd out private stores one for one, until
the government accumulated greater stores than would be held by private agents. Any further
accumulation by the government would reduce the range of equilibria in which agents could
anticipate extinction.
Finally, it is worth noting that this model suggests that if one country reduces the price
of ivory by protecting its elephants, this reduces the incentive to poach in other countries. In
conventional models of non-storable resources, increased anti-poaching efforts in one country
will initially drive up the price of the good, encouraging extra poaching in other countries.
Under this model, increased anti-poaching efforts in one country may reduce poaching in
other countries, both in the short run and in the long run.
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35Appendix A Proofs for Section III
Proposition A.1 The path of population, x, stores, s, and price, p, is continuous on an
equilibrium path.
ProoI Together, the storage and poaching conditions imply that the equilibrium price
path must be continuous in time. A jump up in price would violate the storage condition, and
a jump down in price would imply an instantaneous infinite growth rate of the population,
which is impossible.
While there is poaching, p = c(x), which is continuous and monotonic, so population,
x, must be continuous. In the no poaching r6gime, population develops as 111.7,so is
continuous. Population cannot jump suddenly across r~gime changes, either, as that would
require a jump in price so there is an instantaneous harvest. Population is thus continuous.
Stores are differentiable within r6gimes, and so are continuous, For thereto be a jump in
stores across r6gimes, there would have to be an instantaneous harvest, which would require a
jump in price, which is impossible. Hence stores are continuous.
A. 1
Proposition A.2
(a) The maximum initial value of population plus stores the system may have and still get to
the storage equilibrium path s.(x) is Q-, where
Q-= max{ X-, S.(XU)+ Xu },
(b) Qm is decreasing in storage cost, r.
Proof (a) Q- must either be X_, or the point lying on thes = Oaxis and the
tangent to s.(x) of gradient -1, These tangencies occur at Xu or Xs (F(x) = Oin equation 111.9
gives ds/dx = -1). s.(x) is concave at XS,so Q- cannot be associated with X5.
Al(b) If Q~m = X-, then s.(Q-) = O. Differentiating with respect to r,
)




s,’(x) is just (111.9),and ds/dr is:
A.2






since x > Xs*, and s.(x) must be non-negative. The second term is zero, because at X~*,the
storage condition is satisfied with equality, and that is precisely what is in the parentheses.






If Q- = S(XU)+ Xu, then, because Xu is independent of r, the result follows in the same way,
but then the equivalent of A.3 holds because the second term vanishes because Xu is
independent of r.
Proposition A.3 If initial population and stores are (xO,SO)then if, and only if
m
(xo,so)= up@-, (A,)= ~,,
t=()
A.5
where P is the projection operator P(x,s,p) = (x,s), i = + or e, and $f is the time evolution
operator mapping {x(0), s(0), p(0) } to {x(t), s(t), p(t)}, there is a starting price p. and poaching
resumption time tp so that @f(xo,so,po)is an no poaching equilibrium leading to the point
A2(x, si(x), c(x)) at time tpfor some x. These equilibria are not, in general, unique. There maybe
equilibria leading to A. and A+. There may also be cases where the equilibrium passes through
PA+or PA. on its way to another point. If there are multiple equilibria from the same point
(xO,SO),then the one with the lower starting price must have a steeper trajectory in s-x space,
since stores will be consumed faster with a lower price.
In other words, there is a no poaching equilibrium ultimately leading to the steady state
XSif and only if L+(xo)e so and so> S+(xO),where L+is the left boundary of the set E+defined
in A.5. Likewise, there is an no poaching equilibrium leading to extinction if and only if
L,(xo) < so, and so > S.(xo). See Figure 111.5, Li are downward sloping. L. and L+will be the
same line if X- S X~.
Proof By Figure 111.5. Li are downward sloping, because they are possible no poaching
paths, and so stores are decreasing, while population is increasing.
Proposition A.4 If the habitat available to the population is increased sufficiently, it is
always possible to make X~> Q-.
Proof Denote the available habitat by K, and the total population, in real units by $.
Thus x = ~/K. We assume that demand, measured in real units, is independent of habitat, and
that the poaching marginal cost, c, is a function only of population relative to habitat. Thus
c(x) = c(~/~, The dynamics of the population in real units without storage will be:
j= KB(@/K) - D(c(@ /K)), A.6
which implies that
A3i = B(x) – +D(c(x)) . A.7
The steady states Xs, and XUwill be functions of habitat, K, and are such that the RHS of A.7





This means that increasing the habitat more than proportionally increases the population in the
high steady state. This is not unsurprising, given that demand has not changed.
In the region where Q-is close to Xs, Q- = Xu + S.(XU). We may write this as:
(




When we differentiate this expression with respect to K,
dQmax &u u ‘“D(c(q))c’(q) — =— _—
~K ~ dK K’+o
dq–1<–l. A.1O
K2rc(q)
Thus Q-is falling with K at a rate bounded away from zero
therefore, that we can find K large enough that Q- < Xs.
Xs is rising with K. It must be,
A4Appendix B Proofs for Section IV
Proposition B.1 p, is a decreasing function of Q, continuous on [0, Q-]. For
Qe[O, U(c~)], p.(Q) =U1(Q). For Q~[U(c~), QM], p.(Q) =c(x.(Q)).
Proof If Q> U(c~), thesystemjumps tox.(Q), andtheprice isthenc(x.(Q)). If
Q< U(c~), theprice will be Vi(Q). x.(Q) isdecreasing in Q,andcontinuous asrequired. U1
is decreasing in Q. U1(U(c~)) = cm= c(0) = c(x,(U(c~)), sop. is continuous at U(c~),
Proposition B.2 dQ/dt = Owhen x = Xu or X,S.The line where dx/dt = O, Qo(x), is
increasing in x, and increasing in n. For n in a suitable region (see below), there are two
steady states, (Xu, Qu), and (X~,Q~), and
Q=p’’(wc(xi))where’isuors
B.]
Both Qi are increasing with n. The line x = x~(Q) is a trajectory of the system. See Figure
IV.2.
Proof Since dQ/dt = F(x), dQ/dt = Oiff x = Xs or Xu. From IV.3, the line where
dx/dt = Osatisfies
(r+n)c(x) =np.(Qo(x)). B.2
Differentiating with respect to x,
dQo
(r+ z)c’(x) = v;(Q,(x)) ~ . B.3
c’ and p.’ are both negative, so Q. must be increasing with x, for given n. Differentiating the
same equation with respect to n,
aQo
C(X) = PC(QO) +zP; (Qo)~ . B.4
B1So that, on rearranging,




When the system jumps, population cannot rise, so price cannot fall. Hence, c(x) e p., and
B.5 is positive. Steady states are where dQ/dt = dx/dt = O. Substituting X.Sor Xu into B.2
quickly yields B. 1
Proposition B.3 (Xu, Qu) is totally unstable; there may or may not be oscillato~
behavior. (Xs, Qs) is hyperbolic for all n. The stable manifold is thus a line, upward sloping,
and passing through (Xs,Qs). See Figure IV.3
Proof Consider x and Q near the steady states, (x,Q) = (Xi+ ~, Q;+ e), where ~ and e











p, rand c’ are always negative. F(XU) >0, and F(Xs) e 0. Thus at (Xs, Qs) the discriminant is
strictly larger than (r+ n)2, and so one eigen-value is strictly positive, the other is strictly
negative. This means that, locally, there exist 1 dimensional stable and unstable manifolds for
this fixed point. At (Xu, Qu), the discriminant is less than (r+ n)2, and may be negative. Both
eigen-values have, therefore, strictly positive real parts, and the steady state is totally unstable.
B2Proposition B.4 X~X is decreasing with n, X~O= X~*> X~, There always exists nf at
which X.S’i = X~, so that for Oc z < nl, X~’> X~, and for z > nl, X~K e X~.
rc(X~ )
“ = pe(x~)–c(xs)
Proof X~X is the point at which:
B.8
B,9
When n = O,this is the same as the relation defining X,S*.Figure IV.4 shows X~n. Let
A(x,n) = [ (r+ Z)C(X) - rip.(x) ] / c’(x). Since the line A(x,Tc) for constant n crosses F(x) from
below, dA(X~X)/~x> F(X.SX). Hence,
If X,Sn = X~,then F(X~) = O,so Zf, if it exists, satisfies (r+rc)c(Xs) = np,(X~). Because p. > c, a
solution does exist.
Proposition B.5 If stores run out, they must do so at X~m.This is only possible if
X~’> X~,in which case it is a minimum of stores. If X~’c X~it is a maximum.
Proof The rate of change of stores goes from -to Oto+ as x falls across X~’. But if
X~x< X~,then A(Xs, n) >0, and so x is increasing, not decreasing. Thus stores are at a
maximum, as stated.
Proposition B.6 For given parameters, there is only one equilibrium path (but
see Proposition IV.8) in the storage r6gime. If z e Zl, there is a path Q = s+’(x) + x where
B3stores run out at X~n> X~and the system reverts to the no storage r~gime. If n 2 nl, the
equilibrium path is the stable manifold of the fixed point (X~,Q~). See Figure IV,5
Proof If z < nl, then stores may run out at X~’,and we get exactly the same
equilibrium structure as in section III. The system cannot go to extinction before the switch,
because that path would be the one the system would switch to. In that case, assuming a n
hazard of switching is meaningless. The system cannot follow the stable manifold of
(X~,Q~), Why not? Proposition IV,3 proves that np.(Q~) = (r + n)c(X~). If n < n{then
(r+~)c(Xs) < npe(X,S),so we must have Xs > Qs. This would mean that, if the system were on
the stable manifold, it would have to tend to a point with strictly negative stores, which is not
allowed. Thus it is not rational ever to be on the stable manifold. If n > Zf, then the opposite
happens: stores may not run out at X~x,but the system may move along the stable manifold in
equilibrium.
Proposition B.7 If z > n~, then the system must be in the extinction equilibrium, where




ProcJ~ QS is increasing in z and, once past nl, (XS,Qs) is the only stable steady state
before the switch to extinction. As discussed above, Q S Q- for all points in equilibrium
before the switch. Thus if Q > Q=, the stable manifold to (XS,Qs) cannot be an equilibrium.
If there is a z at which QS= Q-, then it satisfies: np.(Q-) = (r+ n)c(XS). But p.(Q-) is
just c(Xu) (recall Figure IV. 1). Solving this for n, such a ~h does exist, and is as claimed.
B4Table I: Some Species Used for Storable Goods or by Collectors







































































Red and Blue Lorry
Parrots
Quetzal Pharomachrus
mocinno
Roseate Spoonbill Ajaia
ajaia
Macaws Ara spp.
Hyacinth Macaw
Medicinal Plants
species of Dioscorea
species of Ephedra
Dioscorea deltoidea
Rauvol!a serpentine
Curcuma spp.
Parkia roxburghii
Voacanga gradl~olia
Orthosiphon aristasus
Rauvoljia
species of Aconitum
Rattan
Calamus caesius
C. manun
C. optimus
Orchids
Dendrobium aphyllum
D. bellatulum
D. chqsotoxum
D. farmeri
D. scabrilingue
D. senile
D. thqsiflorum
D. unicum
Trees
Astronium urundeuva
Aspidosperma polyneuron
Ilex paraguaiensis
Didymopana morotoni
Araucaria hunsteinii
Zeyhera tuberculose
Cordia milleni
Atriplex repanda
Cupressus atlantica
Cupressus dupreziana
Diospyros hemiteles
Aniba duckei
Ocotea porosa
Bertholetia excelsa
Dipterix alata
Abies guatemalensis
Tecto~ hamiltoniana
Mahogany
Teak
Other Plants
Himalayan Yew
Green Pitcher Plant
Sm. Begonia
Chisos Mt.
Hedgehog’s
Cactus
Key Tree Cactus
Nellie Cory Cactus